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ABSTRACT 
 
The Influence of Non-state Actors on International Environmental Policy.  
(December 2010) 
Zowie Natasha Hay, B.A., Lancaster University; 
 M.A., University of Durham 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Ahmer Tarar 
 
This dissertation examines the sources and consequences of non-state actor 
influence in international environmental policymaking. I argue that non-state variables 
inside of a country, such as the strength of environmental non-governmental 
organizations (ENGOs), public attitudes towards the environment, and the level of inter-
personal trust between citizens, can act as important determinants of state actions in the 
international environmental policymaking realm.  
The empirical analyses of these propositions provide the main bulk of this 
project. My first empirical chapter tests the hypothesis that the strength of domestic non-
governmental organizations can affect the likelihood of a country participating in 
international environmental agreements, and finds that countries with more ENGOs are 
party to more international environmental agreements than countries with fewer ENGOs. 
My second empirical chapter examines the impact of public opinion on the treaty 
ratification behavior of a country, and finds that the greater the level of public support 
for the use of international environmental agreements to address environmental 
 iv
problems, the faster a country ratifies the Kyoto Protocol.  My final empirical chapter 
demonstrates how levels of inter-personal trust between citizens can impact the extent to 
which a state complies with its environmental treaty obligations, and shows that higher 
levels of trust are linked to higher rates of compliance with environmental treaties, but 
that this effect is mediated by the degree of ethnic diversity within a country.  
Given the significance of my findings, I conclude with the argument that non-
state actors are able to influence the participation, ratification and compliance behavior 
of states in international environmental policymaking arena.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: INCORPORATING NON-STATE ACTORS INTO  
 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 
 
The primary goal of this dissertation is to account for the influence of non-state 
actors in international environmental politics. I do this by examining the way in which a 
country’s behavior in the international environmental arena can be governed by forces 
whose origins lie outside of the purview of the state. I argue that non-state variables 
inside of a country, such as the strength of environmental non-governmental 
organizations (ENGOs), public attitudes towards the environment, and the level of inter-
personal trust between citizens, can act as important determinants of state actions in the 
international environmental policymaking realm. By examining the role of non-state 
factors over the various stages of international environmental policymaking – the initial 
decision to participate in an international environmental treaty, the dynamics of treaty 
ratification, and post-agreement compliance behavior – I hope to provide a fuller picture 
of the sources and consequences of non-state actor influence in international 
environmental politics.   
The empirical analyses of these propositions provide the main bulk of this 
project. In Chapter II, I test the hypothesis that the strength of domestic non-
governmental organizations can affect the likelihood of a country participating in 
international environmental agreements. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how  
 
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of American Political Science Review. 
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the initial decision of a state to address environmental problems at the international level 
can be influenced by the presence of interested non-state actors. In Chapter III, I 
investigate the effect of another potential non-state influence on government action, the 
role of public opinion. Using the context of Kyoto Protocol ratification, I demonstrate 
that public attitudes towards the use of international environmental agreements to 
address environmental problems can affect the speed in which a government ratifies the 
Kyoto Protocol. Chapter IV centers on the post-agreement stage of international 
environmental policymaking. In this chapter I demonstrate how levels of inter-personal 
trust between citizens can impact the extent to which a state complies with the treaty 
obligations of the international environmental agreements that it signs. 
The realm of international environmental policymaking provides a fruitful 
context for examining the role of non-state behavior on international outcomes. 
International environmental problems are often characterized as being both “global and 
local” (Skaerseth 2003). Environmental crises arise from the aggregation of local 
resource management decisions which originate at the “household level” (Princen et al. 
1994, Auer 2000), and yet the consequences of these actions can spill across the 
boundaries of the nation-state. Conversely, international environmental policy is formed 
at the global level, but often requires implementation at the local level in order to be 
effective (Brunner and Klein 1999). Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect that 
research examining attempts to mitigate international environmental problems should 
conduct itself across these multiple levels of analysis and examine multiple stakeholders 
and actors in order to fully capture the range of actors and processes involved. However 
 3
including non-state actors in explanations of international outcomes becomes 
problematic given the current orientation of international relations theory, which is 
shaped by a state-driven view of international action.  
 This assumption of the state as the primary actor has its origins in the dominant 
theoretical paradigms of international relations theory where states are considered the 
primary actors in international affairs (Russett and Starr 1996). Traditional neo-realist 
and neo-liberal views of the international system both promulgate a systemically 
determined view of state behavior. Therefore, these theories relegate forces arising from 
beneath or outside of the state to secondary explanatory status, or they ignore their 
potential impact entirely.  
Within the neo-realist framework, the international system exists in a state of 
anarchy, meaning that there is no central authority with which to set or enforce rules of 
behavior. The choices that states can make in international affairs are constrained by the 
structure of the international system (Waltz 1979; Keohane 1984).  Interactions between 
states within this anarchical structure are governed by the distribution of power among 
states, and states are thus motivated to seek to increase their share of this power in order 
to preserve their continued existence in the international system (Waltz 1979). The neo-
liberal paradigm also subscribes to this logic of international anarchy, but differentiates 
itself from neo-realism by highlighting the role that international institutions can play in 
mitigating the effects of anarchy. As in neo-realism, the state is the primary actor, 
although neo-realism does allow on occasion for the inclusion of domestic-level 
determinants of state behavior, such as regime type, though the variables it considers are 
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still very much tied to the apparatus of the state. Regardless of whether state behavior is 
influenced horizontally by the power capabilities of other states, or whether it is 
constrained vertically by institutional rules and norms, both theories appoint the state – 
or state derived institutions - as the natural locus of agency and the only actor with 
which we need to be theoretically concerned. While they acknowledge that non-state 
actors exist, they are considered irrelevant to explanations of international politics 
(Waltz 1979). 
 While state-centered explanations of interactional action remain dominant in 
international relations discourse, there has been an increasing demand for a method by 
which non state actors can be incorporated into explanations of international outcomes 
(Auer 2000). This new literature attempts to provide a “fuller picture” of who 
participates in IR by allowing explanations that move beyond traditional state-based 
systemic determinism to allow for other sources of influence (Zakaria 1992: 198). In 
addition, prominent scholars have leveled criticisms against the restrictive nature of both 
neo-realism and neo-liberalism, arguing that the theories need to be able to take account 
of non-traditional actors in order to fully capture the dynamics of the international 
system. For example, Snyder (1991: 319) argues that more attention needs to be paid to 
the interaction between international and domestic politics and less to making assertions 
about the primacy of one or the other in international affairs. Similarly, Keohane regards 
the state as unitary actor assumption with some suspicion, arguing in After Hegemony 
that “no systemic analysis can be complete…that is, we will have to introduce some unit 
level analysis as well (Keohane 1984: 26). There is a movement therefore reject the 
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state-as-primary-actor assumption and find a way to incorporate the role of non-state 
actors into existing explanations of international outcomes.  
Research on international environmental policy has not been immune to the 
general progression of IR theory towards the inclusion of domestic-level variables in 
explaining international outcomes (cf. Putnam 1988, Moravcsik 1997). However, the 
prominence of regime theory in analyses of international environmental cooperation has 
resulted in a largely state-centered theory of international action in the international 
environmental policymaking realm (Newell 2000, Skaerseth 2003). Regime theory seeks 
to explain how cooperation can occur between sovereign nations in different issue areas, 
despite the absence of a higher authority to enforce agreed-upon rules.1 Early attempts 
by researchers to explain international environmental cooperation often utilized this 
regime approach in their analysis (Young 1989; Paterson 1996; Rowlands 1995). States 
are credited with providing the impetus for regime formation, and these regimes increase 
predictability and security in international affairs by guiding the behavior of the regime 
participants (Young 1980; Rittberger 1993). While disagreement exists as to why 
regimes form and endure, for example whether they are power-based or interest-based; 
the state is commonly credited as a single unitary actor within a regime.  
 Similar state-centric explanations for behavior also extend to the post-agreement 
stage, in which states are expected to comply with the provisions of the international 
agreements that they have signed. Explanations of non-compliance are driven by the 
                                                 
1 The following is a commonly cited definition of regimes: "Regimes are sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a 
given issue area of International Relations" (Krasner 1983:3).   
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traditional assumption that states are rational self-interested actors and are able to 
accurately determine the costs and benefits of different actions. Quite simply, non-
compliance is a realization that the costs of following an agreement outweigh the 
benefits – what Underdal (1998) terms the ‘calculus of compliance’. Key to this strand 
of research is that the decision to sign an agreement and the decision to comply with an 
agreement are modeled as separate choices. Therefore there are instances where a state 
may sign an agreement in order to reap political benefits, such as enhancing its 
international reputation (Keohane 1984) or appeasing domestic constituents (Roginko 
1994) while ultimately lacking the sincere intention to comply. When it comes to the 
compliance decision, factors such as the ability to free-ride (Stein 1983) and how close 
the finished treaty is to a state’s ideal point in the negotiation stage (Fearon 1998) can be 
used to explain why some states comply more than others when it comes to honoring 
international commitments.    
 This research has been disputed by those who argue that the decision to 
cooperate and the decision to comply cannot be so easily disentangled. Chayes and 
Chayes (1995) stress that the amount of time and resources a state spends negotiating 
and ratifying agreements makes it unlikely that these are just empty gestures of 
cooperation. This is part of a school of literature argues that non-compliance is not a 
result of state unwillingness, but rather the inability of a state to comply with the 
provisions of an agreement due to a lack of state capacity at a technical and 
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administrative level.2 Good-faith efforts to comply with the provisions of an agreement 
may be hampered by the inefficiency of the state due to the administrative burden 
implementing legislation places on a state. Various studies of compliance behavior have 
lent support to these arguments. For example, in comparing rates of compliance with 
environmental accords across nine countries, Jacobson and Brown Weiss (1995) 
conclude that the administrative capacity of the state is a crucial explanatory variable. 
Similarly, Mbaye (2001) examines the link between compliance and capacity, finding 
that infringement cases fall as bureaucratic efficiency rises.  
 However, these explanations of compliance still focus on state-level variables as 
the primary determinants of compliance behavior. Yet actual compliance behavior is 
often not the purview of states, but rather the individual citizens of a state. While 
international obligations are often framed in terms of state obligations, they are usually 
are directed at regulating the behavior of private actors that exist within the purview of 
the state (Chayes and Chayes 1995; Simmons 2010). This is particularly true with 
respect to international environmental treaties given that the environmental problems 
they are designed to address are simultaneously both global and local (Mitchell 1992; 
Skaerseth 2003).  
Attempts to move beyond the state-centered regime approach highlighted the role 
of non-state actors in the international policy process, with a particular focus on the 
impact of transnational groups (Princen et al. 1994; Risse-Kapan 1995; Wapner 1996). 
                                                 
2 Capacity in this context is broadly defined as the efficiency and expertise of a bureaucracy, and the 
amount of fiscal resources a state has to implement an agreement (Chayes and Chayes 1993; Jacobson and 
Brown Weiss 1995). 
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These findings suggest that non-state actors may wield significant influence, for 
example, transnational epistemic communities3 are found to be essential in the provision 
and dissemination of the knowledge required to create international policy (Haas 1992, 
Hawking 1993). Liftin (1993) also draws attention to instances in which regime 
formation was not initiated by states, but rather the impetus for regime creation was 
provided by non-state actors, for example the role of the World Wildlife Foundation in 
pushing for the Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species (CITES). Yet 
despite this evidence, our theories have no way to account for the prominence of non-
state actors in international environmental policymaking. This becomes a problem 
because:  
If it can be shown that non-governmental actors have some influence on 
the interests and expectations that states bring to the process of 
institutional bargaining in the international fora, then an important 
challenge is posited to the way in which we currently seek to explain 
policy (Newell 2000: 27).   
 
 In this dissertation I will attempt to remedy this gap in current international 
relations theory. This project considers the influence of non-state actors at various stages 
of the international environmental policy process; specifically the way these actors 
influence a nation state’s participation in, ratification of, and compliance with 
international environmental agreements. This research does not explicitly reject the idea 
                                                 
3 An epistemic community is: “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a 
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within than domain or issue-
area” (Haas 1992:3) 
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that states are the primary actors in international affairs, but rather argues the inclusion 
of non-state actors in theories of international outcomes is necessary to provide a fuller 
explanation of the sources of state behavior. This is not to argue there is no merit to the 
proposition that non-state actors can also assert an independent influence in the 
international environmental area, but rather to declare a primary interest in elucidating 
the mechanisms by which non-state actors can influence state behavior and how this can 
be incorporated into current international relations theory. I identify three major non-
state sources of influence as being relevant to state behavior in the international 
environmental policymaking arena; these are environmental non-governmental 
organizations, the strength of public support for international environmental action, and 
the levels of domestic inter-personal trust between citizens. The following empirical 
chapters demonstrate the significant role that factors originating from outside the state 
play at various stages of international environmental policymaking, and make a case for 
their inclusion into existing frameworks of international relations theory.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
ENGO STRENGTH AND STATE PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
 
 While many scholars have remarked upon the proliferation of international 
environmental agreements to solve environmental problems, national responses to the 
existence of these agreements are not uniform. As such, we observe great variation in 
participation rates across states, with some states becoming party to nearly all possible 
agreements, while other states actively resist being entangled in international 
environmental regulation (Victor and Skolnikoff 1999; Meyer et al. 1997; Roberts 1996, 
2001). Explanations to account for this variation have mostly centered on state-level 
characteristics, from economic to environmental factors (see Timmons-Roberts, Parks 
and Vasquez 2004). In contrast to this line of research, I posit that this variation in 
participation behavior can be explained by the varying strength of environmental non-
governmental organizations (ENGOs) across countries.  
 Interest in the potential impact of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on 
political outcomes is not new, and evidence for the influence of these groups can be seen 
in a variety of different issue areas. NGOs have been credited with playing a key role in 
the passage of various international laws and treaties throughout history. NGO activities 
in the 1800s have been linked to the eventual passage of anti-slavery laws in England 
and Europe (Quirk 2006); and in the early 1900s, the Anglo-Oriental Society for the 
suppression of the opium trade were part of an anti-drug movement that successfully 
pressured states into passing the 1912 Hague Opium Convention (Loy 2000). From case 
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studies addressing the impact of specific NGOs on specific policy to more general 
treatises on multi-level governance and global civil society, an increasing number of 
scholars have applied themselves to elucidating the mechanisms by which NGOs interact 
with national and international decision-makers and the precise manner in which these 
groups can affect political outcomes.  
 In the context of environmental issues, ENGOs have been shown to have some 
impact on domestic environmental behavior, but it is not yet clear if this influence 
extends to motivating national decision-makers to participate in the international 
environmental arena. While there is an established research framework to examine the 
effects of ENGO participation in international environmental negotiations and how they 
can influence treaty provisions (Betsill 2002; Betsill and Corell 2001), there is less 
research available that addresses the mechanisms by which ENGOs affect the initial 
decision of a country to join an environmental agreement. By examining the effect of 
domestic ENGO strength across countries, I hope to clarify the impact of ENGOs on 
state behavior by demonstrating how they can pressure states into participating in 
international environmental agreements. This research also provides an alternative 
explanation for the variation in participation rates across states in international 
environmental agreements by using a framework that is able to incorporate the role of 
non-state actors into accounts of state behavior.  
 This chapter proceeds in the following way. First I review previous research 
examining the impact of environmental non-governmental organizations on both the 
domestic and international environmental behavior of a state, using this literature as a 
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jumping off point to explain  in more detail how I expect ENGO strength to condition 
state participation in international environmental agreements. After hypothesizing on the 
effects of ENGO strength on participation rates and providing a description of my main 
independent and control variables, I test my hypothesis using a negative binomial 
regression of ENGO strength on participation in international environmental agreements 
for 107 countries. After presenting my empirical findings and discuss the ways in which 
they support my hypothesis, I use the final section to discuss the implications of my 
results and draw conclusions regarding the appropriateness of using ENGO strength to 
explain the variation in participation rates in international environmental agreements 
across countries.  
PREVIOUS RESEARCH: ESTABLISHING THE IMPACT OF ENGOS 
  There has been an abundance of research which suggests that the presence of 
ENGOs in a country has a positive effect on the degree to which a country works to 
protect the environment. At the domestic level ENGOs are thought to be able to 
encourage the passage of pro-environmental legislation through various lobbying 
activities directed at national policymakers. At the international level, it has been 
demonstrated that states grant ENGOs access to environmental negotiations due to their 
issue-specific expertise, and it is through this expertise ENGOs are able to influence the 
content of international environmental agreements. Yet neither strand of this literature 
has yet to satisfactorily ascertain if ENGOs affect the initial decision of a state to 
participate in international environmental agreements. This literature review will briefly 
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review findings for both strands of research before developing a theory of how ENGO 
presence can affect a country’s level of international environmental commitment.  
The first part of this literature review addresses the work that attempts to find for 
ENGO influence on environmental outcomes at the domestic level. In terms of influence 
on national policymaking, ENGOs are thought to act in the same way as other types of 
domestic interest groups by lobbying policymakers in an attempt to secure the passage of 
environmental legislation. These lobbying activities are intended to convince 
policymakers that undertaking pro-environmental actions will translate into greater 
political support (Ainsworth and Sened 1993; Austen-Smith 1993; Grossman and 
Helpman 2001).  
 However, while a number of formal models and qualitative case studies have 
been used to illustrate the ways and conditions under which ENGOs can play a role in 
determining the direction of a country’s environmental policy (Hurrell 1992; Fredriksson 
1997; Birner and Wittner 2003; Conconi 2003), the quantitative empirical evidence is 
less convincing, and has been unable to fully test many of the assertions made by this 
literature. In contrast, the empirical literature attempts to find a link between the actions 
of a particular ENGO and the passage of a specific piece of environmental legislation 
rather than testing for the effect of ENGO influence in general, and is thus unable to 
fully test the mechanisms by which this influence may operate. In addition, the majority 
of this work is restricted to case studies of US environmental policy, making it difficult 
to draw conclusions about the importance of ENGOs outside of this specific political 
context.  
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This is not to say that these studies are not useful in tracing the mechanisms of 
ENGO action. This research also demonstrates that in the context of US environmental 
policy, ENGOs are able to wield some influence over policy outcomes, providing some 
empirical foundation for theorizing that this relationship might also exist in other 
countries, or at least in countries with similar political systems. Unfortunately, the 
magnitude of this ENGO effect is found to be small. Two separate studies examining the 
impact of ENGOs on the passage of coal strip mining legislation in the US House and 
Senate conclude that ENGOs only have a weak impact on voting outcomes. Kalt and 
Zupan (1984) demonstrate that membership in ENGOs influence the voting decision in 
the US senate, while Durden et al (1991) find a positive effect for ENGO contributions 
on voting outcomes in the US House of Representatives. However both studies find that 
this influence is below average when compared to the effect of other factors influencing 
the voting decision. Similarly, in their study of the effect of grassroots environmental 
lobbying, Fowler and Shaiko (1987) show that ENGOs have a positive impact on the 
passage of environmental policies in the US Senate. However, they caution that this 
effectiveness of ENGOs is contingent on other factors such as issue-type and state-level 
variables.  
There have been a few attempts to explore the relationship between ENGOs and 
domestic environmental policy outside of the US domestic political context, although 
this research mainly takes the form of qualitative case studies. This research yield 
findings similar to the empirical literature discussed above, that ENGOs have some 
influence, but that this influence may be mediated by other factors. Hurrell (1992) 
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examines the impact of Brazilian ENGOs in pressuring the government to cease 
Amazonian deforestation. While he found that they were effective in creating an 
awareness of the problem, the author concludes that actual policy change was ultimately 
driven more by external pressures. In their study of social capital on a Community 
Forestry bill in Thailand, Birner andWittner (2003) find ENGOs have a significant 
impact on legislation. These case studies of successful ENGO action have also been 
useful in providing examples of some of the mechanisms by which ENGOs are able to 
succeed. Using the case of ENGO activism in Botswanna, Thomas (2003) explores the 
mechanisms by which these environmental groups were able to halt the proposed 
development of the Okavango Delta in 1990, identifying the ability of ENGOs to 
provide governments with expertise as a crucial factor explaining their success. Likewise 
the Birner and Wittner (2003) study suggested that ENGOs were most successful at 
achieving their goals when they played a role in disseminating knowledge about the 
environmental issue to the public.  
Attempts to draw conclusions concerning the influence of ENGOs outside of 
specific case studies prove more difficult as cross-national empirical studies of ENGO 
influence are still relatively rare. In addition these studies often use outcome measures of 
environmental quality as their dependent variable, implicitly assuming that positive 
environmental outcomes can be traced to the successful passage of the relevant 
legislation. For example Fredriksson et al (2005) find that the number of ENGOs in a 
country has a negative effect on lead content levels in gasoline, while Binder and 
Neumayer (2005) show that national ENGO strength is significantly related to lower 
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levels of domestic pollution. In the study with the largest cross-national sample, 
Fredriksson et al (2005) look at the relationship between environmental pressure group 
strength and environmental policy stringency across 92 countries. Their findings 
demonstrate that an increase in environmental pressure group strength is associated with 
an increase in the strictness of environmental regulation, but the authors also use an 
outcome measure as their dependent variable – in this case lead content levels in 
gasoline – rather than an actual legislative measure. However, as previously mentioned, 
outcome measures may not be appropriate to gauge the impact of ENGOs as it implicitly 
assumes that it has been legislative action that has caused an environmental condition, 
whereas the environmental outcome can also be the result of a number uncontrolled for 
factors.  
 Moving to the international level, there is a significant amount of research 
activity which focuses on the influence of ENGOs during international environmental 
policymaking. The majority of research is directed at the role that these organizations 
play in the negotiation of international environmental agreements. ENGOs have been 
portrayed as key players in the negotiations of various international environmental 
agreements, ranging from the adoption of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Betsill 
2002), to a continued influence in the International Whaling Commission (Andresen and 
Skodvin 2003). The reason identified for this influential role during international 
negotiations is widely agreed to be the provision of expertise and technical knowledge 
that ENGOs are able to provide during the treaty making process. Thomas (2003) 
characterizes the ENGO-state relationship as one of repeated interactions, where ENGOs 
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are keen to provide relevant and useful information to governments, and in turn 
governments come to increasingly rely on their expertise. Thomas argues that this is the 
way that ENGOs have become woven into the international environmental policymaking 
process. There has been some empirical evidence to support these theoretical claims. In 
their case study of ENGO influence in international lawmaking for the protection of the 
ocean, Stairs and Taylor (1992) found the informational role of ENGOs to be key to 
their incorporation into the negotiation process. Corell and Betsill (2002) find that 
ENGO knowledge of local and traditional development tasks helped to explain their 
influence in the negotiations on the Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCDD), 
and ENGO influence in Kyoto Protocol negotiations can similarly be explained by the 
provision of technical expertise, in this case sinks and emissions trading.  
It is theorized that the influence of ENGOs in the international area have 
expanded as a result of their provision of this expertise. Environmental interest groups 
write and distribute briefing books to delegates prior to debates on international 
environmental issues (Smith and Connelly 1999), and in rare cases some are even 
granted power to act on behalf of the state. Stairs and Taylor (1992) use the cases of 
New Zealand and Vanuatu to demonstrate how this facet of ENGO influence grows from 
their informational expertise. In the negotiations over waste disposal at sea, New 
Zealand assigned one of its delegation positions to a national Greenpeace staff member. 
Similarly, when participating in climate change negotiations, Vanuatu appointed two 
ENGO members to their delegation who were especially skilled in environmental law. 
 However, while this research is useful in elaborating on some of the mechanisms 
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by which ENGO influence is thought to operate at the international level, these studies 
fail to address whether ENGOs may have had an impact on the initial decision of a state 
to participate in the negotiations. I use the logic of the literature on ENGOs and domestic 
environmental outcomes to posit that ENGOs provide some impetus for a country to 
address its environmental problems by joining international environmental agreements.  
HYPOTHESIS 
 
 Due to the trans-boundary nature of environmental problems countries 
increasingly use international environmental agreements to address these environmental 
problems, yet we see variation in international environmental treaty participation. I argue 
that variation in domestic ENGO strength across countries can help to explain this 
finding. If, as demonstrated by previous research, ENGOs can successfully apply 
pressure to governments at the domestic level to follow more environmentally desirable 
policies, then ENGOs will also pressure governments to participate in international 
environmental agreements, one of the main tools countries currently use to address 
environmental problems.  
I expect that governments under a greater degree of pressure from environmental 
groups will participate in more international environmental agreements. This leads me to 
my main hypothesis for this chapter. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the strength of ENGO presence in a country, the more 
international environmental agreements in which a country participates. 
 
 19
The following section describes the data and empirical model I use to test my 
hypothesis, along with a discussion of additional control variables to be included in the 
analysis.  
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA 
In order to establish the role ENGOs play in influencing a country’s international 
environmental treaty participation behavior, I examine how domestic ENGO strength 
affects the likelihood of joining international environmental treaties in general. I test my 
hypothesis using a sample which consists of 107 different countries drawn from all 
regions of the globe. Figure 1 shows the variation in international environmental treaty 
participation behavior across the sample.4  
Given that my dependent variable is a count variable (number of treaties joined), 
usual OLS regression models are not suitable for this analysis. The level of dispersion in 
the dependent variable indicates that a negative binomial model would be the most 
appropriate method with which to test my hypothesis. While time-series data would be 
preferable, given the problems of data availability for my independent variable of 
ENGOs strength, I do not include data across multiple years in my analysis. Therefore 
this is a simple cross-sectional model, with the dependent variable showing treaty 
participation across countries for 2003. However, to allow for the fact that treaty 
participation is not an instantaneous process, data for the independent variables are 
included at their 2002 values. This also controls for the problem of reverse causality, i.e. 
                                                 
4 The graph shows country variation across my dependent variable. The maximum number of treaties 
available to sign in this instance is 220. Please see the data notes for the dependent variable for more 
information.  
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that participating in a treaty resulted in the formation of a related ENGO. The specific 
question being addressed with this set of data is how well ENGO strength in 2002 
explains how many international environmental agreements a country has joined by 
2003.     
 
Figure 1: Variation in International Environmental Treaty Participation across Countries. 
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE  
Participation in International Environmental Agreements 
 Participation in international environmental agreements reflects a country’s 
desire to be seen as working to solve environmental problems on the international stage. 
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Participation in an environmental agreement does not necessarily mean that a country 
plans to abide by the provisions of the treaty, nor is it a guarantee of improved 
environmental outcomes. I make no claim that countries who participate in a greater 
number of treaties are more environmental than those countries who participate in fewer 
treaties. Instead I argue that participation in an environmental treaty is a signal that a 
country’s government has responded to domestic pressure to be involved in a specific 
treaty-making process.  
 My participation measure is taken from the data records of the Global Civil 
Society Index. The variable is a measure of the number of treaties signed by each 
country out of a list of 220 global environmental agreements generally pertaining to 
environmental conservation.5 Data are coded for the year 2003, which was the most 
recent data update at the time of coding. The country participating in the fewest treaties 
is Bhutan, with membership in 4 of the 220 treaties. At the other end of the scale is 
France, with membership in 122 of the treaties.  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
ENGO Strength 
 A number of researchers have attempted to tackle the problem of measuring 
ENGO strength across countries given the scarcity of comparable cross-national 
indicators. The most common approach, as exemplified by Fredriksson, Neumayer, and 
                                                 
5 The 220 treaties fall into the following categories of environmental issues according to the list 
maintained by the Environmental Treaties and Resource Indicators (ENTRI) project : animal species 
protection – management; environmental conservation (general); fishing – management – use of 
harvestable fish; forest conservation – management – exploitation; hunting – management – use of 
harvestable species; marine resources conservation – management; natural resources and nature 
conservation; plant species protection – management; renewable energy sources and energy conservation; 
soil conservation – management; water resources conservation – management. 
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Ujhelyi (2007), is to use the number of domestic ENGO groups within a country. This is 
the approach taken in this analysis. In line with previous literature, ENGO strength is 
measured as the number of national environmental non-governmental organizations who 
are registered members of the World Conservation Union. Data are taken from the 
records of the International Union for Conservation of Nature website, and are coded for 
the year 2002. Thirty-five countries in the sample have no registered ENGO groups, 
while the United States had the greatest number of ENGOs, with forty-four registered 
groups.  
 Using a count of ENGO groups in a country is admittedly a blunt tool for 
capturing the concept of ENGO strength. This method implicitly assumes that a country 
with more domestic environmental non-governmental organizations has a stronger 
environmental lobby than a country with fewer groups. However, this measure takes no 
account of group size or group resources, and it is feasible to imagine a scenario where 
many smaller organizations are less effective than one powerful organization. An ideal 
measure of ENGO strength would include measures that can capture elements of size 
and resources, such as membership numbers or operating budgets, but these data do not 
yet exist on the scale needed for this project.  
 Another approach to measuring ENGO strength is to look at the domestic 
membership data for a global environmental group. This is the approach taken by Von 
Stein (2008), who uses cross-country membership in Greenpeace, one of the most active 
ENGOs, as her indicator of ENGO strength. While this also has its weaknesses as a 
measure, for example Greenpeace membership may be lower in countries with a well 
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developed ENGO sector due to the presence of viable alternatives, it is able to capture 
additional nuances that a simple count of organizations cannot. Table 1 shows the 
correlation between the two measures as well as the additional control variables, and the 
results confirm that these measures are picking up different aspects of ENGO strength. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Correlation between ENGO Number, Greenpeace Membership per Capita, and Control Variables. 
 
 
 ENGO  Greenpeace Ecorisk Polity GDP 
ENGO  1.0000     
Greenpeace 0.2853    1.0000    
Ecorisk -0.0100    0.0861    1.0000   
Polity 0.3170    0.2601    0.1902    1.0000  
GDP 0.4329    0.4865   -0.0760    0.4985    1.0000 
 
 
 Therefore in addition to the number of ENGOs in a country I also analyze the 
effect of Greenpeace membership per capita. I use Von Stein’s measure, which consists 
of the number of Greenpeace members in a given county, as reported by the 
organization, divided by the country’s population.  
CONTROL VARIABLES 
 Before running my analysis, it is also necessary to consider what other factors 
could be theoretically expected to influence a country’s participation in an international 
environmental agreement. For this reason, the following variables are controlled for in 
my model.  
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Environmental Risk 
 Given that international environmental agreements are designed to address 
environmental problems, we would expect that environmental conditions in a country 
would have some impact on the motivation of a country to participate in an 
environmental treaty. Specifically, if objective environmental factors drive behavior, 
countries under a greater degree of environmental risk should join more treaties that 
countries with relatively unharmed ecosystems. For this reason, I control for the 
condition of a country’s ecosystem as a factor affecting participation in international 
environmental treaties.  
 In order to capture the level of environmental risk, I use the percentage of a 
country’s territory classed as a threatened ecoregion. Ecoregions are fundamental to 
biodiversity, housing a large array of plant and animal species. The higher a country 
scores on this measure, the more at risk plant and animal species are for extinction. 
Threatened ecoregions are ecoregions with high ratios of habitat conversion to habitat 
protection that are classified as endangered or critical (ESI 2005). Data are taken from 
Hoekstra et al (2005).  
Level of Democracy 
 Previous research has demonstrated that democracies are more likely than non-
democracies to engage in international cooperation in general (Mansfield and Pevehouse 
2008) and this relationship has been shown to exist with regard to international 
environmental cooperation, with democracies making more international environmental 
commitments than non-democracies (Neumayer 2002). Therefore I control for the effect 
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of democracy in my analysis, using the polity variable from Polity IV. This variable 
ranges from -10 to 10, with -10 being the least democratic and 10 being the most 
democratic. Across the countries in the analysis, Swaziland is the least democratic with a 
score of -9, while 26 countries in my sample take on the maximum value of 10.  
GDP 
 Research in economics suggests that environmental quality is not only a 
collective good, but that it is also a ‘superior’ good, that is, demand for environmental 
quality rises with income (Franzen 1994). The logic behind this argument is that if 
resources are scare, a country would prefer to devote those resources to other areas. This 
is not to say that environmental concern is lower in poorer countries, but rather – as 
argued by Neumayer (2008) – that poorer countries prioritize other issues over 
environmental quality. Therefore, we should expect to see a positive correlation between 
a country’s wealth and it’s participation in international environmental agreements. Data 
are reported as GDP per capita ($1000) and are taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators.  
RESULTS 
 Table 2 shows the impact of ENGO strength on the international environmental 
participation behavior of countries. As can be seen from the table, when ENGO strength 
is measured as the number of ENGOs per country, ENGO strength has a positive a 
significant impact on the number of international environmental treaties in which a 
country has membership. This finding lends support to my argument that ENGOs are 
 26
able to successfully place pressure upon government to address environmental problems 
through the use of international environmental agreements. 
 
 
Table 2: Negative Binomial Regression of ENGO Strength on Participation in International Environmental 
Agreements. 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient Robust 
Standard 
Error 
z-score P>|z| 
ENGO Number .0193422* .004967 3.89 0.000 
Greenpeace .0024334 .0458576 0.05 0.958 
Environmental 
Risk 
.0026657* .0008744 3.05 0.002 
Polity .0356746* .0078419 4.55 0.000 
GDP .0230312* .0041318 5.57 0.000 
Constant 2.03721 .0779008 26.15 0.000 
N = 107     
  
 
 However, in contrast, when ENGO strength is measured using Greenpeace 
membership per capita, no significant relationship is found between ENGO strength and 
the participation behavior of countries. While this result shows that Greenpeace 
membership per capita has no significant impact on the participation behavior of 
countries in general, it does not necessarily mean that Greenpeace membership per 
capita has no effect on the motivation of countries to join specific treaties. However, 
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given the previously discussed significance of the ENGO variable, this finding may also 
be an indication the variable Greenpeace membership per capita does not adequately 
capture the concept of ENGO strength, and that measuring the size of one particular 
ENGO in a country does not lend itself to inferences concerning the level of ENGO 
strength in a country in general.  
 In line with previous literature, all of the control variables in my study were 
found to have a significant impact on a country’s participation in international 
environmental agreements. As expected, domestic environmental conditions have an 
impact on the likelihood of a country to participate in international environmental 
agreements. The positive and significant relationship indicates that countries facing a 
greater degree of environmental risk will participate in more agreements than those 
countries facing a lesser degree of environmental risk.  
 The analysis also shows support for the theory that democracies are more likely 
to engage in international cooperation than non democracies, and finds that this 
relationship holds for international environmental cooperation. The significance of the 
polity variable demonstrates that countries with higher democracy scores participate in 
more international environment agreements that countries with lower democracy scores. 
Similarly, the significant relationship between GDP and treaty participation is in line 
with findings demonstrated by previous research investigating the link between a 
country’s wealth and its level of environmental commitment. My findings indicate that 
countries with higher levels of GDP per capita participate in more international 
environmental agreements than countries with lower levels of GDP per capita.   
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CONCLUSIONS 
 This chapter has demonstrated that the domestic strength of the ENGO lobby in a 
state is a factor in explaining patterns of environmental treaty participation across 
countries. Given that countries with a stronger environmental lobby tend to participate in 
more international environmental agreements that countries with a weaker 
environmental lobby, this lends support to my argument that ENGOs play a vital part in 
the initial decision of a state to join an international environmental treaty. Given the 
reviewed literature on ENGOs and domestic policy, a likely mechanism for this effect is 
the pressure such groups are able to apply to national decision-makers.  
 In addition, the findings of this chapter also confirm my overarching proposition 
that non-state actors affect state behavior in international environmental politics, but that 
they do not displace the state as a key actor, rather they form part of  a country’s 
decision making calculus. The significance of the control variables indicate that 
traditional state-level characteristics also play a role in explaining whether or not a 
country chooses to participate in an international environmental agreement.  However, 
this research highlights the necessity of including non-state actors in explanations of 
state behavior in the international environmental arena, as this analysis shows that 
ENGOs have a significant impact on the decision to join an international environmental 
agreement.   
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CHAPTER III  
PUBLIC ATTITUDES, PUBLIC ACTIONS, AND THE RATIFICATION OF THE  
 
KYOTO PROTOCOL 
 
Can public pressure move a government to ratify an international environmental 
agreement? While there is an abundance of research demonstrating the impact of public 
opinion on domestic environmental policymaking, there has been a paucity of research 
examining this relationship with regards to international environmental policy. Does the 
relationship between public opinion and government action still hold for issues that exist 
outside of the domestic public policy domain? This question becomes increasingly 
important in the context of environmental policy given the increasing use of bilateral and 
multilateral agreements by countries to address environmental problems. Are the public 
still able to influence the actions of policymakers when these actors are operating in the 
international, rather than domestic, sphere?   
 Conventional wisdom suggests that governments are still susceptible to public 
opinion even when operating at the international level. For example, during the recent 
meeting of the CITIES Conference of The Parties (CoP15), a petition containing 
500,000 signatures was presented to the member countries of the African Elephant 
Coalition.6 The signatures were a result of a global online petition criticizing proposals 
by Zambia and Tanzania requesting permission to be allowed to resume cross-border 
ivory trading. At the conclusion of CoP15 it was decided that the 21 year ban on ivory 
                                                 
6 The petition reads: “To the 175 parties of the UN Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species: As citizens from around the world we call on you to reject any exemptions in the global ban on 
ivory trade, to extend that ban for at least 20 years, and to take all necessary steps to enforce that ban and 
protect the elephants. http://www.avaaz.org/en/protect_the_elephants/ Accessed 15th April 2010.  
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sales would remain in place, and additional proposals to downgrade elephants to a lower 
level of protected species were also voted down. President of the Species Survival 
Network, Will Travers, praised the petition, remarking: “the petition no doubt made a 
difference and helped achieve the right result for elephants everywhere.”7  
 This petition was one of many similar online environmental campaigns run by 
Avazz.org, a “global online advocacy community that brings people-powered politics to 
global decision-making.”8 The central assumption behind groups such as these is that 
decision-makers are responsive to public opinion, and that when public opinion is 
harnessed and directed, e.g. through on-line petitions, it can influence policy decisions 
that occur at the international level. However, at the heart of this assumption lie several 
unanswered questions. What role does public opinion play in international 
environmental policy making? Is public opinion able to affect the decision calculus of 
policymakers when dealing with issues that exist outside of the domestic sphere, and if 
so, by what mechanism does this influence operate?   
 I investigate these questions by looking at the role public opinion plays in a 
state’s decision to ratify a specific international environmental agreement - the Kyoto 
Protocol. I argue that among those countries who are signatories to the Kyoto Protocol, 
the level of domestic public support for the environment will condition how quickly each 
country ratifies the agreement. I also go beyond current research on public opinion by 
attempting to parse out the mechanisms by which public attitudes impact policymakers 
                                                 
7“Save the Elephants: Stop Bloody Ivory” http://www.avaaz.org/en/protect_the_elephants/ Accessed 15th 
April 2010. 
8 “About Us” http://www.avaaz.org/en/about.php Accessed 15th April 2010. 
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at the international level. Is it the general expression of pro-environmental attitudes that 
provide the context in which a government is more likely to ratify an international 
environmental treaty, or does public opinion have to be channeled through specific 
avenues, such as petition-signing or protest behavior, before it has an impact? To answer 
this question I also look at the impact of ‘public action’ in addition to public opinion as a 
possible explanation of ratification behavior.   
THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC OPINION ON GOVERNMENT POLICY 
 There has been an abundance of research directed at determining what role the 
public plays in shaping policy decisions made at the national level, and much of it 
supports the idea that the public can influence decision-makers in areas of domestic 
policy such as healthcare (Grogan 1994) and welfare spending (Fording 1997). The logic 
of median voter theory underpins the theoretical argument made by this literature, in 
which the nature of electoral politics drives elected officials to seek to minimize the 
difference between the policy preferences of voters and their own policy choices (Downs 
1957). Government officials recognize the need for public support if they are to maintain 
power, and pay attention to shifts in public opinion so they will be reelected (Burstein 
1998; Burstein and Linton 2002). In this way the public are able to act as a constraining 
mechanism on the policy choices of decision makers, both by electing politicians that 
share their views and by inducing incumbents to adopt electorally popular policy 
positions if they wish to remain in power (Erikson, Makuan and Stimson 2002). This 
relationship has been repeatedly demonstrated by researchers. In his review of thirty 
studies gathered from the leading political science and sociology journals, Burnstein 
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(2003) finds that public opinion is found to have a significant impact on domestic policy 
in 75% of the studies in his sample. Burnstein also highlights the robustness of these 
findings, noting that the effect of public opinion is significant across time periods and 
issue-areas.    
 However, in contrast, there has only been a relatively minor amount of research 
addressing whether the relationship between public opinion and government action still 
holds for issues that exist outside of the domestic public policy domain. The growing 
salience of intermestic issues such as immigration, international trade, and the 
transnational environment increasingly require the involvement of domestic actors in the 
international arena, but it is unclear if the constraining effect of public opinion extends to 
this area. For example, while initial research on the effects of public opinion on 
American Foreign Policy suggested that the general public has some influence over the 
actions of national decision-makers in the international arena; subsequent studies have 
suggested that the magnitude of public influence is less pronounced than at the domestic 
level. So while Jencks (1985) demonstrated that the correlation between public opinion 
on defense spending and actual defense spending between 1973 and 1980 was 
exceptionally high (r=.94); further studies in this area have added some caveats. When 
studying the effect of aggregate public opinion on military spending, Hartley and Russett 
(1992) also demonstrate that increasing levels of public support are associated with 
increases in actual defense spending. Yet they find the influence of the public to be less 
important than other factors operating during this time period, such as political relations 
with the Soviet Union or the size of the budget deficit. Similarly, in their study of public 
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opinion change from the 1930s to the 1980s, Page and Shapiro (1983) find that in 62% 
of cases a change in public opinion was followed by a subsequent change in foreign 
policy. However, they also argue that policy responsiveness is far from perfect, and that 
policy can sometimes move in the opposite direction to public opinion. It is unclear from 
this research whether the ‘public-as-constraint’ argument holds when looking at 
international policymaking.  
 This paper therefore investigates what the impact of public opinion is on 
international environmental policy. With regard to the environmental policy sphere, the 
relationship between public opinion and government action seems to mirror the general 
findings discussed above. At the domestic level, a number of studies have found a link 
between public attitudes concerning the environment and domestic environmental 
policy. Looking at the link between public preferences and governmental decision-
making, Monroe (1998) compares the distribution of public opinion with policy 
outcomes across nine policy areas from 1980 to 1993. In the area of energy and the 
environment he finds consistency between public opinion and subsequent environmental 
policy in 72% of his cases, with energy and the environment having the second highest 
consistency rating across all policy areas. Similarly, Brace et al. (2002) examine the 
relationship between state-level public opinion measures (also across various policy 
domains, but including environmentalism) and state-specific policies in the United 
States. They find their public opinion on environmental matters to be correlated with 
environmental policy outcomes. These findings are also confirmed by Lewis (2005), 
who tests the influence of public opinion across various public policy areas including 
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environmentalism in the fifty US states. Lewis finds a positive and significant 
relationship between public opinion and domestic environmental policy i.e. as a state’s 
public opinion becomes more liberal a states policy becomes more pro-environmental.  
 However, the nature of studies such as these make it difficult to say with 
certainty if the link between public opinion and environmental policy operates at the 
international level, the level at which environmental policymaking is increasingly taking 
place. The majority of the studies examining this relationship restrict the scope of their 
analysis to state-level public opinion and environmental policy measures within the 
United States (cf. Ringquist 1993). While this case study evidence is prevalent and 
suggests that public opinion plays a role in policymaking, there has been little work 
which examines this relationship outside of the US context or beyond domestic 
environmental policy outcomes. In addition, while many studies have found a correlation 
between public attitudes and domestic policy, there is little attempt to explore the 
mechanisms by which public opinion may be influencing policy. A notable exception is 
the work by Hays, Elser and Hayes (1996). In their analysis of the determinates of state 
environmental policy they find that the effect of public opinion on policy outcomes is 
not a direct one, but rather that public opinion has a direct impact on environmental 
group membership and elite party liberalism; and that it is the impact of these two 
variables, not public opinion itself, which affects policy outcomes. Agnone (2007) also 
characterizes the relationship between public opinion and environmental policy as in 
indirect one, citing the mediating effect of protest behavior.  
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 Given these concerns, my investigation into the effects of public opinion on 
international environmental policy improves on existing research in the following ways. 
I expand beyond the current US based state level analysis to examine if the relationship 
between public opinion and public policy exists beyond this geographical context. I also 
conduct one of the first investigations of the impact of public opinion on international 
environmental policy in order to see if this relationship between the public and 
policymakers is restricted solely to the domestic policymaking arena. In addition, I also 
refine the concept of public opinion by breaking it down into two separate measures: 
public attitudes and public action. In this way I attempt to gauge the mechanisms by 
which the public are able to influence international environmental policy.  
HYPOTHESES 
 Theoretically, if domestic public opinion indicates a demand for environmental 
protection, then in line with the ‘constraint’ argument, governments should respond to 
the opinion of their citizens and act in general accordance with their wishes. Therefore, 
in countries where public opinion shows support for the use of international 
environmental agreements to address environmental problems, we would expect to see 
national legislatures choosing to ratify international environmental agreements. This 
proposition leads to the following hypothesis.  
 
     Hypothesis 1: The higher the public support in a country for the use of international 
environmental agreements to address environmental problems, the faster a country 
ratifies the Kyoto Protocol. 
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In addition, I also examine the possibility that it is public action specifically, rather than 
levels of public support in general that motivates a government to respond to the wishes 
of its citizens. In this scenario I would expect that environmental activism, for example, 
contributing money to an environmental group or signing a petition would lead a 
government to take pro-environmental actions such as ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. This 
leads to my second hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the degree of environmental activism in a country, the 
 faster a country will ratify the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA  
 A Cox proportional hazards/duration model will be used in order to assess the 
impact of public support and public attitudes on ratification. Countries begin in the 
model ‘at risk’ of ratification, and exit the sample by ratifying the agreement. Looking at 
the length of time until ratification has an advantage over studying the dichotomous 
decision of whether to ratify, as it allows for greater variation between countries 
(Neumayer 2002), and also serves to communicate the intensity of a country’s 
preference for the agreement (Fredriksson and Gaston 2000). The total sample size 
consists of forty six countries, with the sample being limited by the availability of public 
opinion data. All countries for which public opinion data were available were included 
in the analysis.  
 
 
 37
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Ratification Delay 
 Ratification Delay is the number of days between the agreement being open for 
ratification and the agreement being ratified by a country. Countries become ‘at risk’ of 
ratification on March 16th 1998, the date the Kyoto Protocol was opened for ratification. 
Countries either leave the sample by ratifying the protocol or they remain at risk until the 
end of the observation period (1st January 2010 – 4308 days). Of the forty six countries 
in the sample, only the one (the United States) fails to ratify during the observation 
period, meaning the dependent variable is right censored. Table 3 shows the breakdown 
of ratification behavior across the sample. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Ratification Delay Times. 
 
Countries N Mean Minimum Maximum 
All 46 1899 427 4308 
Annex 1 22 2049 1099 4308 
Non-Annex 1 24 1760 427 3474 
 
  
 Across all countries the mean ratification time was 1899 days. The first country 
in the sample to ratify the protocol was Georgia, after 427 days, and the last was Turkey 
after 3696 days. When the sample is separated into Annex 1 and Non-Annex 1 countries 
we find that the mean ratification time is longer for those countries classified as Annex 
1.  
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
Public Support  
 Public support for the use of international environmental agreements to combat 
environmental problems is calculated using data from the 1995/1998 wave of the World 
Values Survey.  The measure is the percentage of people in each country who ‘strongly 
agree’ with the statement:   
 
“[COUNTRY]'s environmental problems can be solved without any international 
agreements to handle them.”9 
 
It is assumed that the greater the percentage of people who agree with the statement, the 
lower the level of public support for international environmental agreements. Data range 
from a minimum of 3.9% of respondents agreeing with the statement in Norway to a 
maximum of 56.9% percent of respondents agreeing with the statement in Mexico.   
Public Action 
 The variable of public action is constructed from responses to two sets of 
questions from the 1995/1998 wave of the World Values Survey summed together. The 
questions ask if the respondent has engaged in environmental actions such as attending a 
meeting about an environmental issue, signing a letter or petition addressing an 
environmental problem, or if they have contributed money to an environmental 
organization. It is assumed that the greater the percentage of people who have engaged 
                                                 
9 Please see Appendix A for the full text of the survey questions used in the construction of the 
independent variables. 
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in these sorts of activities, the more likely the public is take action over environmental 
issues in general. The least environmentally active country in the sample is Georgia with 
only 4.2% of respondents having engaged in the above activities, while the most active 
is Nigeria, where 64.8% of respondents have taken action over the environment.   
CONTROL VARIABLES 
 It is possible that additional institutional and environmental factors may 
contribute to the speed in which a government ratifies the Kyoto Protocol. For this 
reason, the following control variables are also considered. 
Commitments under Kyoto: Annex 1 vs. Non-Annex1  
 The Kyoto protocol classifies countries as either Annex 1 (developed nations and 
nations with economies in transition) or non-Annex 1(developing nations).10 Given that 
Annex 1 countries have more legal obligations under the Kyoto Protocol than non-
Annex 1 countries, it is likely that Annex 1 countries will take longer to ratify the 
Protocol. To account for this possibility I run my analysis across three models. Model 1 
contains the entire sample, whereas Model 2 and Model 3 divide the sample into Annex 
1 and non-Annex 1 countries respectively.  
ENGO Strength 
 It is possible that the strength of the environmental lobby may impact the time it 
takes a country to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore I control for the presence of 
environmental non-governmental organizations within a country. In line with 
Fredriksson, Neumayer, and Ujhelyi (2007), ENGO strength is conceptualized as the 
                                                 
10 Please see Appendix B for the full list of classification by countries.   
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number of national environmental non-governmental organizations that are members of 
the World Conservation Union. Data is taken from the official International Union for 
Conservation of Nature website, and is coded for 1998, the year the Kyoto Protocol was 
opened for ratification. It is assumed that ENGOs will be in favor of the Kyoto Protocol, 
and therefore governments in countries with greater ENGO strength will be under more 
pressure to ratify the agreement, which in turn could affect ratification speed  
Executive Constraint 
 To capture cross-national differences in political institutions that may affect the 
speed it takes a leader of a country to pass legislation in general, I control for the number 
of domestic checks and balances an executive faces. Data are taken from the Polity IV 
project’s xconst variable, and the measure ranges from a score of 1 (leader has unlimited 
authority) to 7 (executive parity – other domestic groups have equal authority to the 
executive in most areas of activity).11 It is assumed that checks and balances in the 
domestic political arena will hinder the speed of ratification. Data across the sample take 
a minimum value of 2 and a maximum value of 7. The variable is recorded for 1998.  
Democracy 
 It has been argued that countries with democratic institutions and democratic 
values are more likely to participate in international environmental agreements, and are 
more likely to have progressive domestic environmental policies in general (Congleton 
1992; Deacon 1999). Therefore we might expect that more democratic countries will 
ratify an environmental agreement sooner than less democratic countries. For this reason 
                                                 
11 Polity IV Codebook: p23-24 
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I control for cross national variations in the level of democracy. The democracy variable 
is coded for 1998 and data are taken from the Polity IV dataset and range from 0 (non-
democratic) to 10 (fully democratic).   
CO2 Emissions  
 The central purpose of the Kyoto Protocol is to reduce the amount of greenhouse 
gases emitted, of which CO2 is a major contributor. Therefore we would expect countries 
with higher CO2 emissions/per capita will find it more costly to comply with the 
provisions of the Kyoto Protocol than those countries with lower CO2 emissions per 
capita. The higher the cost of compliance, the more reluctant a government may be to 
ratify the agreement, which may lead to a longer ratification period, or the decision not 
to ratify the agreement at all. Therefore I control for a CO2 emissions per capita. Data 
are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and are recorded at 
their 1998 values. Across the sample CO2 emissions range from 0 metric tons per capita 
(Bangladesh and Nigeria) to 20 metric tons per capita (United States).  
GDP 
 Many studies find a positive effect of per capita income on environmental quality 
(Millimet et al 2003; Neumayer 2008). There is also a documented link between national 
wealth and general government capacity. Therefore richer countries might ratify 
environmental agreements more quickly than poorer countries. Data on GDP per capita 
($1000) are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and are entered 
into the dataset at 1998 levels.  
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 Table 4 provides a summary of my theoretical expectations concerning the 
relationships between rising values of the variables of interest as measured in the data 
and their predicted effect on the hazard rate.  
 
 
 
Table 4: Expected Relationship between Rising Variable Values and the Hazard Rate. 
 
 
Variable Effect on Hazard Rate 
Public Support ↓ 
Public Action ↑ 
ENGO ↑ 
Executive Constraint ↓ 
Democracy ↑ 
CO2 Emissions ↓ 
GDP ↑ 
 
 
RESULTS  
 
Table 5 provides a summary of the effect of public support and public attitudes 
on the speed of ratification across the three different model specifications. As evidenced 
by Table 5, none of the variables in Model 1, in which the sample for the analysis 
includes both Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries, managed to achieve significance. 
However, when Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries are analyzed separately (Models 2 
and 3), we see that multiple variables of interest have a significant impact on the time it 
takes for a country to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.  
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Table 5: Summary of Proportional Hazard Models. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 shows the full results of Model 2, the impact of public support and public 
action on the speed of ratification for Annex 1 countries.  
 
 
 
Variable Model 1: 
All Countries 
Model 2: 
Annex 1 
Model 3: 
Non-Annex 1 
Public  Support .9860505 
(.0257233) 
.8785849* 
(.0684039) 
.9981587 
(.0344642) 
Public Action .9994386 
(.0008197) 
.9981164 
(.0013187) 
1.000474 
(.0016598) 
ENGO .9796739 
(.0289548) 
.8099551** 
(.0537925) 
1.139105** 
(.0697881) 
Executive Constraint .7795835 
(.2652051) 
1.217053 
(.7410753) 
1.080853 
(.6500391) 
Democracy  1.159138 
(.2289087) 
.9118597 
(.3475998) 
.8215222 
(.2717607) 
CO2 Emissions .9107491 
(.0525759) 
1.136898 
(.1071173) 
.9316694 
(.1380393) 
GDP 1.038145 
(.0261868) 
1.100484** 
(.0351782) 
1.137533 
(.1489867) 
N 46 22 24 
Hazard rates are reported. (Standard Errors in parenthesis)  
 
  *p >0.1 
**p> 0.05 
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Table 6: The Impact of Public Support and Public Action on the Speed of Ratification for Annex 
1 Countries. 
 
 
 
As predicted by my first hypotheses, the higher the level of public support for the 
use of international agreements to solve environmental problems, the less time it takes 
for a country to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The survival analysis shows that a percentage 
point increase in the number of people in the country who strongly agree that 
international environmental problems can be solved without the use of environmental 
agreements corresponds to a 12.2% decrease in the hazard rate i.e. a decrease in the 
Variable Hazard Ratio 
(s.e) 
Z P> [z] 
Public  Support .8785849* 
(.0684039) 
-1.66 0.096 
Public Action .9981164 
(.0013187) 
-1.43 0.154 
ENGO .8099551** 
(0537925) 
-3.17 0.002 
Executive Constraint 1.217053 
(.7410753) 
0.32 0.747 
Democracy  .9118597 
(.3475998) 
-0.24 0.809 
CO2 Emissions 1.136898 
(.1071173) 
1.36 0.173 
GDP 1.100484** 
(.0351782) 
3.00 0.003 
N = 22    
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likelihood that the agreement will be ratified. The substantive interpretation of this 
relationship is that the lower the level of public support in a country for taking 
international action to address environmental problems, the longer that country takes to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore in Annex 1 countries, public support is shown to 
have a significant effect on the speed in which a country ratifies the Kyoto protocol.   
My second hypothesis, that those countries demonstrating a higher degree of 
environmental activism would ratify the Kyoto Protocol faster than countries with less 
environmental activism, is not supported by the findings of this model. Neither did the 
findings reflect any significant effects for the control variables, with the exception of 
ENGO strength and GDP per capita. However, somewhat surprisingly in this case, the 
effect of ENGO strength on the speed of ratification is in the opposite direction as that 
predicted by the theoretical literature. The analysis shows that for every additional 
national environmental non-governmental organization that is a member of the World 
Conservation Union, the hazard rate of ratification decreases by around 19%. Therefore, 
in this instance, an increase in ENGO strength is associated with an increase in the 
length of time it takes to ratify the Kyoto protocol. In contrast the GDP variable is 
significant and in the direction suggested by previous research. The data show that for 
every $1000 increase in GDP per capital, the likelihood that the Kyoto Protocol will be 
ratified increases by roughly 10%.  
 Table 7 shows the results of the survival analysis for Model 3, Non-Annex 1 
countries. 
 
 
 
 46
Table 7: The Impact of Public Support and Public Action on the Speed of Ratification for Non-
Annex 1 Countries. 
 
 
When the analysis is restricted to the sample of non-Annex 1 countries the data 
fail to show support for either of my hypotheses. Neither levels of public support nor the 
degree of public action have a significant impact on the speed of ratification. In addition, 
the majority of the control variables remain insignificant. Once again, the exception is 
ENGO strength. In Non-Annex 1 countries, ENGO strength appears to reduce the 
amount of time it takes for a country to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. For every additional 
Variable Hazard Ratio 
(s.e) 
z P> [z] 
Public  Support .9981587 
(.0344642) 
-0.05 0.957 
Public Action 1.000474 
(.0016598) 
0.29 0.775 
ENGO 1.139105** 
(.0697881) 
2.13 0.034 
Executive Constraint .1.080853 
(.6500391) 
0.13 0.897 
Democracy  .8215222 
(.2717607) 
-0.59 0.552 
CO2 Emissions .9316694 
(.1380393) 
-0.48 0.633 
GDP 1.137533 
(.1489867) 
0.98 0.325 
N = 24    
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national environmental non-governmental organization that is a member of the World 
Conservation Union, the hazard rate of ratification increases by 13.9%.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 The results of the survival indicate that studies attempting to explain factors 
influencing the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol should distinguish between Annex 1 
and Non-Annex 1 signatories. My variables of interest had different relationships to the 
dependent variable depending on which group of countries was analyzed. These findings 
lend support to the idea that the degree of formal obligations contained in a treaty can 
have an impact on ratification speed. In addition, given that the selection of countries 
into Annex 1 and Non-Annex 1 categories is not random but is based upon key national 
characteristics, these characteristics may help reveal some of the mechanisms by which 
the independent variables are operating. For example, public support was found to be a 
significant variable in Annex 1 countries, but insignificant in Non-Annex 1 countries. By 
distinguishing difference between these two countries it may be possible to identify for 
future research why public support affects ratification speed in one set of countries and 
not the other. One possibility could lie in the interaction between public opinion and 
democracy, as in general, democracies are thought to be more responsive to their citizens 
than autocracies, and across the two samples Annex 1 countries have a higher mean 
democracy score than Non-Annex 1 countries.12   
 Public action was not found to have a significant effect on ratification speed in 
any iteration of the analysis. This has different implications for Annex 1 and non-Annex 
                                                 
12 Across the 46 countries in the sample, Annex 1 countries had a mean democracy score of 8.5 while 
Non-Annex 1 countries had a mean democracy score of 6.1.  
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1 countries. In Annex 1 countries it appears that a government responds to general levels 
of public support, such as those attitudes picked up by survey questions, but there is no 
additional impact on the government if those attitudes are manifested into actions. In 
non-Annex 1 countries the government is not seen as responding to public sentiment at 
all, whether it is expressed through attitudes or behavior.  
 The significance of the ENGO strength variable may also provide an explanation 
as to why public action was not found to impact ratification delay. The survey question 
includes the response ‘contributing to an environmental organization’ as an example of a 
public action. This leads to the possibility that public action is being channeled through 
the activities of ENGOs and thus accounts for their impact. So for non-Annex 1 
countries where ENGO strength is found to decrease ratification delay, it seems feasible 
to suggest that successful ENGO action may be determined in part by the amount of 
contributions it receives from the public. I will attempt in future research to disaggregate 
the sources of public action so that the role of contributions to ENGOs can be parsed out. 
In addition the variable of ENGO strength should be modified to take account of the 
financial resources of a group. These steps could help to clarify this relationship.  
 This chapter lends support to the argument that the attitudes of the domestic 
public may have an influence on the ratification stage of international environmental 
policy. However, this finding seems to be sensitive to country characteristics, and in this 
analysis public support was only found to affect the ratification behavior of Annex 1 
countries. The next step in determining the influence of the public attitudes on 
ratification behavior is to identify the specific country characteristics which influence 
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this relationship. However, these initial findings lend support to the argument that non 
state actors can have an impact on the speed in which a country ratifies international 
environmental legislation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 50
CHAPTER IV 
 
TRUST, ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION, AND COMPLIANCE WITH  
 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
 
The fact that states are able to come together to collectively address 
environmental problems is indisputable. The sheer number of multilateral environmental 
agreements present in the international system show that under the right circumstances 
states are able to cooperate with each other in addressing environmental problems.13 Yet 
this portrait of cooperation becomes less rosy when we look at the rate at which states 
comply with the environmental agreements that they have signed. What becomes clear 
when looking at post-treaty behavior is that, as far as environmental agreements are 
concerned, compliance is the exception and not the rule (Weiss and Jacobson 1998; 
Perkins and Neumayer 2004). What factors explain this lack of compliance, and why do 
some states honor their treaty commitments more than others?  
Current theory is not well-equipped to answer this question. Despite a growing 
scholarly interest in issues of compliance (Simmons 2010), research addressing 
questions of international environmental cooperation mainly focuses on how states are 
initially able to cooperate. It is generally assumed that states will comply with the 
agreements that they sign. Given that participation in international agreements is not 
mandatory, and the international system possesses no overriding authority, we would 
expect states to self-select only into those agreements that they want to join and are 
prepared to implement. In fact, the very power of these agreements rest on the 
                                                 
13 Mitchell (2003) puts the number of MEAs at over 700, this is in addition to the 1500 bilateral 
agreements that also exist between states.  
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assumption that once ratified, the provisions of the agreement will be faithfully enforced. 
This is further exemplified by the fact that many research designs operationalize 
cooperation as ratification, with little attention paid to the post-ratification behavior of 
the state. Yet despite this logic, we see cross-national variation in compliance rates of 
international environmental agreements. The prevalence of non-compliance across states 
suggests that the traditional definition of cooperation is too narrow and that the scope of 
traditional study is too limited.  
It is for this reason that I focus on the post-agreement stage of environmental 
cooperation, drawing attention to factors that explain why states do not successfully 
comply with international environmental agreements that they choose to sign. I argue 
that international environmental problems have specific characteristics that make 
compliance with agreements problematic, specifically the fact that the environment is a 
public good with non-excludable benefits. In addition I argue that in order to explain the 
variation in compliance rates across countries we need to move beyond the traditional 
state centered approach and incorporate factors which arise from the interactions of 
actors within a state. By clarifying the microfoundations of compliance behavior within a 
state we can more effectively account for variable compliance rates across states in 
international environmental agreements.   
This chapter proceeds in the following way. First I examine previous explanations of 
compliance, and explain in more detail why I feel it is necessary to move beyond state-
centered accounts and incorporate the role of non-state actors into theories of 
compliance behavior. Secondly, I propose a theoretical framework that models 
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compliance as a collective action game and examines the effect of trust and degree of 
ethnic fractionalization within a state on the likelihood of state compliance with 
international environmental agreements. Thirdly, I provide a description of the data and 
the type of empirical analysis used to test my hypotheses. In section five I present my 
main estimation results and discuss the ways in which they support my hypotheses. I use 
the final section to discuss the implications of my results and draw conclusions regarding 
the impact of trust and ethnic fractionalization on compliance behavior.  
RELATED LITERATURE 
EXPLANATIONS FOR NON-COMPLIANCE 
 Previous research has suggested a variety of reasons why states may not comply 
with the international agreements that they choose sign.14 Much of this work is driven by 
the assumption that states are rational self-interested actors and are able to accurately 
determine the costs and benefits of different actions. Quite simply, non-compliance is a 
realization that the costs of following an agreement outweigh the benefits – what 
Underdal (1998) terms the ‘calculus of compliance’. Key to this strand of research is that 
the decision to sign an agreement and the decision to comply with an agreement are 
modeled as separate choices. Therefore there are instances where a state may sign an 
agreement in order to reap political benefits, such as enhancing its international 
reputation (Keohane 1984) or appeasing domestic constituents (Roginko 1994) while 
ultimately lacking the sincere intention to comply. When it comes to the compliance 
                                                 
14 I define compliance as a “state of conformity or identity between an actor’s behavior and a specified 
rule” (Mitchell 1994: 30). In line with this logic, non-compliance occurs when “actual behavior departs 
significantly from prescribed behavior” (Young 1979). This definition of compliance is not concerned 
with the actual outcomes of an agreement, but rather with a state’s ability to adhere to an agreed-upon rule. 
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decision, factors such as the ability to free-ride (Stein 1983) and how close the finished 
treaty is to a state’s ideal point in the negotiation stage (Fearon 1998) can be used to 
explain why some states comply more than others when it comes to honoring 
international commitments.    
 However, this line of research has been disputed by those who argue that the 
decision to cooperate and the decision to comply cannot be so easily disentangled. 
Chayes and Chayes (1995) stress that the amount of time and resources a state spends 
negotiating and ratifying agreements makes it unlikely that these are just empty gestures 
of cooperation. This is part of a school of literature argues that non-compliance is not a 
result of state unwillingness, but rather the inability of a state to comply with the 
provisions of an agreement due to a lack of state capacity at a technical and 
administrative level.15 Good-faith efforts to comply with the provisions of an agreement 
may be hampered by the inefficiency of the state due to the administrative burden 
implementing legislation places on a state. Various studies of compliance behavior have 
lent support to these arguments. For example, in comparing rates of compliance with 
environmental accords across nine countries, Weiss and Jacobson (1998) conclude that 
the administrative capacity of the state is a crucial explanatory variable. Similarly, 
Mbaye (2001) examines the link between compliance and capacity, finding that 
infringement cases fall as bureaucratic efficiency rises.  
                                                 
15 Capacity in this context is broadly defined as the efficiency and expertise of a bureaucracy, and the 
amount of fiscal resources a state has to implement an agreement (Chayes and Chayes 1993; Jacobson and 
Brown Weiss 1995). 
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 However, these explanations of compliance still focus on state-level variables as 
the primary determinants of compliance behavior. Yet actual compliance behavior is 
often not the purview of states, but rather the individual citizens of a state. While 
international obligations are often framed in terms of state obligations, they are usually 
are directed at regulating the behavior of private actors that exist within the purview of 
the state (Chayes and Chayes 1995; Simmons 2010). This is particularly true with 
respect to international environmental treaties given that the environmental problems 
they are designed to address are simultaneously both global and local (Mitchell 1992; 
Skaersth 2003).  
It is for this reason that I argue that interactions at the sub-state level need to be 
taken into account when explaining the compliance behavior of states. In line with some 
of the aforementioned literature I argue that signing and complying with an agreements 
are two separate decisions, however, I propose that the compliance decision is not one 
made by the state, but rather by the individuals within a state. Therefore we need to 
consider variables that exist at this level of analysis which might make an individual 
more likely to comply with domestic regulations. Interpersonal trust has been theorized 
to have such an effect.  
THE ROLE OF TRUST IN COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOR 
Research on the role of trust suggest that it can be instrumental in solving 
collective action problems, as when trust is high there is an expectation of burden-
sharing, as well as the belief that cooperative actions will be reciprocated. (Ostrom 1990; 
Oakerson 1993; Pretty and Ward 2001). Trust is theorized to increase compliance with 
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agreements by reducing problems of free-riding and cheating, as the presence of trust 
increases the expectation that other actors will also comply. This theory assumes that 
non-compliance is a result of infringements by individual citizens who defect out of fear 
of being a ‘sucker’ and complying with a law that others are shirking. Experimental 
findings support this line of reasoning, demonstrating that individuals are less likely to 
comply with environmental regulations when they also suspect others of non-compliance 
(Boix and Posner 1998).   
There is also empirical evidence linking trust and compliance with domestic law, 
in areas ranging from taxpayer compliance to compliance with government sponsored 
water bans (Scholz and Pinney 1995, Tyler and Degoey 1995). With regards to 
international law, Lampinen and Uusikylä (1998) find a positive relationship between 
trust and the successful implementation of EU directives. This points to the fact that trust 
may have a positive effect on compliance behavior in general.  
A CAVEAT: THE CONDITIONAL EFFECT OF TRUST 
Despite the positive effect of trust is expected to have on compliance behavior, I 
also caution that the effect of trust on compliance is mediated by the degree of ethnic 
fractionalization in a country. There is research to suggest that, under certain 
circumstances, high levels of trust may generate negative externalities. This is in line 
with the social capital literature which distinguishes between positive social capital 
(‘bridging’) and negative social capital (‘bonding’). Important differences exist between 
bridging and bonding social capital in terms of the kinds of relationships generated 
between individuals and the types of outcomes we expect to observe.  
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Bridging social capital is thought to produce ties that span across different groups 
and social networks, bringing people together who have similar interests and goals, 
although not necessarily similar social backgrounds. Bridging social capital is regarded 
as the desirable type of social capital, and is thought to stimulate collective action and 
positive outcomes (Paxton 1999; Putnam 2000; Woolcock and Narayan 2000). 
Conversely, bonding social capital is thought to be a product of division and exclusion, 
and only works to cement homogenous groups together, strengthening ties within, but 
not across, groups. In some cases, bonding social capital has been linked with 
undesirable outcomes, such as inter-group conflict (Hardin 1995; Berman 1997; Gittell 
and Vidal 1998; Beugelsdijk and Smulders 2003). Moreover, Colletta and Cullen (2000) 
demonstrate an association between high levels of bonding social capital and the 
eruption of ethnic violence in Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala, and Somalia. 
Using this logic I posit that a similar type of relationship exists for trust.16 There 
is some research to support this. Uslaner (2000) theorizes that there is a difference 
between generalized and particularized trust. He argues that particularized trust is a 
characteristic of bonding social capital and generalized trust is a characteristic of 
bridging social capital. In sum, just like social capital, there may be a ‘dark side’ to trust. 
Given this, I argue that in ethnically diverse societies, high levels of trust may be 
indicative of high levels of polarization. In this case the type of trust being measured is 
                                                 
16 I discuss social capital and trust as separate concepts, even though the terms are often interchangeable. 
Some studies use trust as their sole indicator of social capital (David 2007). Sonderskov (2007) even 
advocates that all studies should define social capital as trust in order to make studies more consistent and 
comparable.   
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likely to be ‘in-group’ trust and is not expected to have a positive effect on compliance 
behavior.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES  
I model compliance as a coordination game between individual actors at the local 
level. In a traditional coordination game, as displayed in Figure 2, players have the 
following payoff structures:17  
 
Figure 2: Coordination Game. 
Player 2 
 
   Comply           Shirk 
 
 
 Comply 
 
        Player 1 
 
       Shirk 
 
 
 
 
The coordination game has two equilibria, (C, C) or (S, S) i.e. both players 
comply or both players shirk. Both players have receive payoffs if they can coordinate 
on the compliance equilibrium than if they both shirk, but no player wants to receive the 
‘sucker payoff’ of complying while the other player shirks, resulting in the (S, S) 
                                                 
17  Bryant (1983) 
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equilibrium. In sum, it is the fear of the sucker payoff can prevent players converging on 
the compliance equilibrium. 
I argue that the levels of trust in a society help to mitigate the fear that the other 
player will shirk, resulting in a greater likelihood that players will be able to achieve the 
outcome with the highest payoff – the one in which both players comply. As discussed 
earlier, trust can increase compliance behavior by decreasing fears of free-riding and 
increasing norms of reciprocity. Therefore countries that have a high level of trust will 
be more likely to converge on the ‘contribute’ equilibrium choice rather than the 
shirking equilibrium, and will therefore demonstrate higher levels of compliance with 
international environmental agreements. This leads me to my first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the level of trust in a country, the lower the number of 
compliance violations. 
 
THE CONDITIONAL EFFECT OF TRUST: MODELING COMPLIANCE AS A 
COORDINATION GAME BETWEEN DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS  
In contrast to Hypothesis 1, I also argue that in fractionalized countries, high 
levels of trust make individuals more likely to converge on the non-compliance 
equilibrium. This is due to the fact that diverse societies are more likely to generate the 
type of trust that can be linked to negative societal outcomes. In a fractionalized society 
with high levels of trust, compliance is the likely equilibrium outcome between members 
of the same ethnic group, but this belief that other people will not shirk does not extend 
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to individuals who are members of other ethnic groups. As the number of ethnic groups 
in a society increases (i.e. as society becomes more fractionalized) the less likely it is 
that the compliance equilibrium will be a collective outcome. Therefore in those 
countries where a high level of trust is also accompanied by a high level of ethnic 
diversity, trust will result in higher levels of non-compliance with international 
agreements. This is the logic behind hypothesis two: 
 
    Hypothesis 2: In highly fractionalized countries, the higher the level of trust, the 
higher the number of compliance violations. 
 
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA 
 
To establish the theoretical and substantive importance of trust on compliance, I 
examine the impact of levels of trust on the number of environmental violations that 
occur within a state. I test this hypothesis using the original fifteen member states of the 
European Union. The baseline political and economic criteria required for EU 
membership helps create a most similar systems design, which controls for a number of 
unobserved variables across the sample.  In addition, EU membership means that 
citizens of each member state are complying or not complying with the same set of laws. 
Yet, as shown in Figure 3, there still exists substantial variation across member countries 
in rates of compliance. Therefore the EU-15 seems an ideal sample on which to examine 
the impact of trust on compliance.  
Given that the dependent variable is a count variable, and the data is over-
dispersed, a negative binomial model is used to empirically assess the relationship 
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between trust and domestic compliance with IEA provisions. While collected across 
multiple years, the model is not run as a time series due to breaks in the data. Instead the 
model is considered cross-sectional with multiple observations per country. Data are 
clustered by member state to account for problems of non-independence. Lower levels of 
trust in a member state should increase the number of times a country violates an 
international environmental agreement. In addition, the inclusion of an interaction 
variable to capture the relationship between trust and ethnic fractionalization reflects the 
expectation that the effect of trust will be conditional upon the degree of 
fractionalization in a country.   
 
 
Figure 3: Total Infringements of Community Law by Member States, 2006 and 2007. 
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My dependent variable of non-compliance is coded as the number of open 
infringements per country per year, as recorded by the European Court of Justice. These 
data are found in the Annual Survey on the Implementation and Enforcement of 
Community Law, a report released by the European Commission and available through 
their website. This report contains statistics on the number of infringements of 
community law by sector and member state.18  
There is a potential concern that using infringement data from the European 
Court of Justice does not accurately reflect the number of violations actually occurring 
inside a member state. Only a fraction of the number of violations that occur may get 
reported to or detected by the ECJ, the majority may be dealt with  by domestically or 
not be detected at all. However, in line with Borzel et al. (2007) I would argue that there 
is no reason to suspect a systematic bias in the data, as there is no evidence to suggest 
that the ECJ concentrates its efforts on one member-state rather than another. So while 
infringement proceedings may be a blunt measure of compliance, it is currently the best 
measure available, and is at least equally blunt across all member-states.   
The Commission classifies open infringements into three categories, non-
communication (Member-states have failed to notify the Commission on their efforts to 
implement the law), bad application (the law has been implemented incorrectly), and 
non-compliance (the law has been violated). In line with my theory of compliance, I 
only consider cases of non-compliance; cases of non-communication and bad application 
seem more suited to system level explanations. Cases are also not double-counted if they 
                                                 
18  The ECJ also maintains a searchable database of all actions and rulings. This can be found at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en (Accessed February 7th 2009) 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
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remain in the court system long enough to appear in multiple years. Given the data 
availability for the independent variable, data for the dependent variable is coded for 
2002, 2004, and 2006. The number of environmental infringements per country/year 
range from 6 (Sweden, 2006) to 77 (Italy, 2006).  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Trust 
 My main independent variable of trust relies on survey data taken from the 2002, 
2004, and 2006 waves of the European Social Survey. It is coded as the percentage of 
people in each country who answer ‘10’ on a Likert scale in response to the following 
question:  
“Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score 
of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can't be too careful and 10 means that most people can be 
trusted.” 
In the sample, trust ranges from 0.7% (Greece) to 7.9% (Sweden).  
Ethnic Fractionalization 
Fractionalization data is taken from Alesina et al (2003). Data is derived from 
multiple sources of demographic data (Encyclopedia Britannica/CIA Data/Minority 
Rights Group International) which are checked against each other for consistency.   
The score given is the probability that two people drawn at random from the population 
belong to different ethnic groups and is calculated using the following formula:  
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                                                                                N 
FRACTj = 1 - ∑ s2ij 
                                                                               i=1 
 
where sij is the share of the groupi (i = 1…n) in countryj. For interpretation purposes, ‘1’ 
would represent a diverse society and ‘0’ would represent a completely homogenous 
population. In the sample, fractionalization ranges from 0.04 (Portugal) to 0.5 
(Belgium). A country’s fractionalization score does not vary across the time period.  
CONTROL VARIABLES 
In my analysis I also control for system-level explanations previously advocated 
in the literature in order to assess the true impact of trust on compliance. As previously 
mentioned, given the baseline political and economic criteria required for EU 
membership, it should not be necessary to control for a wide range of institutional 
factors. However, there are two main variables that are frequently cited in the 
compliance literature, and thus these are included as controls in the analysis.   
 Government Effectiveness  
It is argued that basic governmental competence is required in order for a society 
to be able to monitor and respond to environmental pressure (Fredriksson and Svensson 
2003). It is possible that levels of compliance may be driven by the capacity a 
government has to implement and enforce legislation domestically. Government 
effectiveness is defined as ‘quantity of public service provision, the quality of 
bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from 
political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies.’ 
Country scores on government effectiveness are taken from the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators project at the World Bank, which aggregates twenty-five sources of
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information on government effectiveness in order to produce comparable indicators. 
Scores are standardized z-scores ranging from 0.74 (Greece) to 2.3 (Denmark).   
GDP 
It has been suggested that environmental performance increases as income per 
capita increases. Dasgupta, Mody, and Wheeler (2001) found strong correlation between 
level of economic development and various environmental indicators. It is also possible 
that ensuring compliance with environmental agreements requires resources for 
monitoring and enforcement at the domestic level, and those countries with more 
resources therefore have less violations. GDP data are taken from the World 
Development Indicators database at the World Bank and operationalized as GDP per 
capita. Data range from $10,654/capita (Portugal) to $51,108/capita (Luxembourg).  
RESULTS 
Table 8 shows the effects of trust and fractionalization on infringements. The 
trust variable is significant and in the expected direction, supporting the hypothesis that 
higher levels of trust between citizens of a country leads to higher levels of compliance 
with EU environmental law. This lends support to the argument that trust in fellow 
citizens helps decrease fears of free-riding, enabling individuals to escape from the 
‘tragedy of the commons’.   
However, as predicted by my second hypothesis, the effect of trust on 
compliance is conditioned by the degree of ethnic fractionalization in a society. When 
trust and ethnic fractionalization are entered into the model as an interaction variable, the 
results suggest high levels of trust in highly fractionalized societies leads to an increased 
 65
number of infringements. This lends support to the argument that there are 
circumstances in which high levels of trust can produce negative externalities.  
 
 
Table 8: Negative Binomial Regression of the Effect of Trust and Fractionalization on Infringements. 
 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Coefficient 
 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
 
z-score 
 
P > |z| 
Trust 
 
-.2135059* . .0643007 -3.32 0.001 
Ethnic Fractionalization19 
 
-.8521527 .5850885 -1.46 0.145 
Trust x  
Ethnic Fractionalization 
 
.8365611 * .2284301 3.66 0.000 
Government Effectiveness 
 
-.2104707 .3300576 -0.64 0.524 
GDP 
 
-.0000328   .0000191   -1.71 0.087 
Constant  
 
4.552271 .4295445 10.60 0.000 
N = 41 
 
        
 
 
The following marginal effects graphs better illustrate how ethnic diversity 
conditions the impact of trust on compliance: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Following Brambor, Clark, and Golder’s (2006) suggestion, the analysis includes all the constituent 
terms used in the interaction variable to avoid biased estimates and omitted variables bias. Therefore Ethic 
Fractionalization is also included by itself as a separate variable.  
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Figure 4 helps to clarify the marginal effect of trust on number of infringements 
as ethnic fractionalization ranges from zero to one. Trust has a negative and significant 
impact on the number of infringements only in societies with low levels of 
fractionalization (0.1145 and below), indicating that trust only decreases infringements 
in relatively homogonous countries. This result accounts for around 40% of my cases. In 
contrast, at higher levels of fractionalization (0.554 and above) trust increases the 
number of infringements, suggesting that trust can have a detrimental impact on 
compliance in ethnically diverse societies. While this result only accounts for around 2% 
of my sample, it is worth noting that in relative terms the EU-15 do not possess the 
ethnic diversity of some African countries such as Gambia (0.78), Liberia (0.9), and 
Sierra Leone (0.81). If the relationship between trust and compliance was examined over 
 
 
 Figure 4: Marginal Effect of Trust on Infringements. 
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an extended sample, it is likely we would see more cases falling into the range at which 
trust increases infringements.  
In countries registering an ethic fractionalization score of around  0.15-0.54, 
there seems to be no relationship between trust and environmental infringements. This 
suggests that trust only matters in mostly homogenous or mostly heterogeneous 
societies.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Marginal Effect of Fractionalization on Infringements. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 helps to further elucidate the relationship between the variables. The 
graph shows the marginal effects of ethnic fractionalization over increasing levels of 
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trust. My theory proposed that ‘high’ levels of trust in a fractionalized society would 
have a detrimental impact on compliance behavior. It is now possible to quantify this 
statement with the finding that fractionalization starts to increase the number of 
environmental infringements in a country when more than 3% of the population would 
answer ‘10’ when presented with a 0-10 scale asking whether they agree that ‘most 
people can be trusted’.   
It may seem counter-intuitive that trust can be linked to negative outcomes in 
diverse societies given the way the measure of trust is obtained by the European Social 
Survey. It would be expected that the way the question is worded ‘in general, most 
people can be trusted’, coupled with the way the variable is coded (only taking into 
account the people who responded ‘10’) would tap into how a respondent feels about 
society as a whole, not just people in their own ethnic group. However, it is feasible that 
polarized societies that exhibit minimal mixing between groups, respondents to the 
survey could infer ‘people’ to mean people of their own ethnic group i.e. they trust the 
people that they know. These findings support the idea that there can be different types 
of trust and, as with social capital, there is some evidence for the existence of a ‘dark 
side’ to trust. These findings also serve as an important caveat to researchers who utilize 
measures of trust from these kinds of surveys as a proxy for generalized trust. We may in 
fact be dealing with something far more specific.  
 The state-level control variables also bring to light some interesting results. 
While producing coefficients in the direction predicted by previous research, neither 
government effectiveness or GDP manage to achieve significance, suggesting that once 
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you account for citizen dynamics at the local level, state-level variables wash out of the 
model. This further speaks to the importance of moving beyond the state-as-unitary-
actor approach when attempting to explain cross-country variations in compliance with 
international law.    
CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter has demonstrated that trust has a significant impact on compliance 
behavior. In the case of the EU-15, countries with higher levels of trust infringe less on 
EU environmental law. I argue that this is because citizens trust each other not to violate 
the law, and that this facilitates convergence on the ‘contribute’ equilibrium of the 
collective action game. Additionally, the significant effect of the interaction variable 
indicates that the effect of trust is mediated by the degree of ethnic fractionalization. In 
an ethnically diverse society, high levels of trust can generate negative externalities. The 
type of trust present in these kinds of societies does not help all citizens to trust each 
other; trust instead works to bond the members of the same ethnic group together, while 
those outside of the group are regarded with suspicion. Due to this, the belief that these 
‘other’ people will defect or free-ride is still present as the expectation of cooperative 
behavior only exists between members of one’s own group. Therefore, in these 
countries, trust is not able to ameliorate the collective action problem.  
 These findings also have several theoretical implications for future research. 
Firstly, IR theory needs to pay more attention to what happens after an agreement is 
signed and ratified. The variations in compliance across countries would seem to 
indicate that not all completed agreements should be counted as a ‘success’. Secondly, as 
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previously discussed, this research demonstrates that trust has a far more nuanced effect 
than it is usually assigned, and scholars dealing with aggregate levels of trust should 
consider the ways in which ethnic fractionalization may condition the effect trust has on 
other variables.  
 Finally, this chapter demonstrates that looking beyond state-level explanations 
can be fruitful in explaining the dynamics of compliance behavior. As shown by this 
study, not only are state-level variables not sufficient in explaining variations in levels of 
compliance, but when analyzed in conjunction with variables that focus on sub-state 
processes, they can lose their explanatory power altogether.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSIONS: ASSESSING THE INFLUENCE OF NON-STATE ACTORS  
 
ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
 
 This dissertation analyzed the influence of non-state actors at three different 
stages of the international environmental policymaking process. I theorized that that in 
the area of international environmental cooperation,  ENGOs and the public attitudes of 
the domestic population work to pressure state decision-makers to take more pro-
environmental action, in this case the joining of international treaties or the length of 
time it takes a country to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. In the post-agreement state I argued 
that levels of interpersonal trust between citizens could help explain the variation in 
compliance rates across states. In all cases, these hypotheses were tested cross-nationally 
in order to be able to draw general conclusions about the influence of non-state actors in 
international environmental policymaking.   
 The empirical results support these hypotheses to some extent. In Chapter II I 
showed that countries displaying a stronger ENGO base were found to participate in 
more international environmental agreements in general than countries with a weaker 
ENGO base, although this finding is sensitive to how the variable of ENGO strength is 
specified. In this instance I found that the number of ENGOs in a state is positively and 
significantly related to the number of international environmental treaties that the state 
joins, but an alternative measure of ENGO strength that has been used in the literature, 
Greenpeace strength per capita, was not found to be a significant predictor of treaty 
participation behavior across countries.  
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 My findings in Chapter III demonstrated the influence of public attitudes on the 
speed in which a country ratifies the Kyoto Protocol. In this analyses I find that the 
greater the level of public support for the use of international environmental agreements 
to solve environmental problems the smaller the ratification delay for the Kyoto 
Protocol. However, this finding is only significant for those countries designated as 
Annex-1 in the Kyoto process, though the impact of ENGOs on ratification delay was 
significant in both Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries. In the final empirical chapter I 
find evidence for the proposition that the higher the level of inter-personal trust between 
citizens the more likely they are to comply with environmental legislation, and I used 
cross-national variation in inter-personal trust to explain the cross-nation variation in 
compliance rates. Thus my empirical work in this dissertation has found for an influence 
of non state actors in these three areas of international environmental policymaking.  
    I aimed to contribute to the existing literature in the following ways. My 
empirical work in this dissertation also makes a contribution to previous research by 
examining to role of non-state influence across multiple countries. In a field usually 
dominated by a case study approach in which the effect of a specific non-state actor on a 
specific policy is analyzed, I test for ENGO influence across 107 countries. I also test for 
the effect of participating in environmental agreements in general rather than a specific 
environmental agreement. Similarly, when examining the impact of public attitudes on 
Kyoto Protocol ratification, I move beyond the traditional approach of using a 
dichotomous outcome as my dependent variable, i.e. was the protocol ratified or not. 
Instead I use survival analysis to consider the speed at which a country ratifies the Kyoto 
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Protocol, allowing a more nuanced examination of the ratification process in a way that 
is amenable to assessing influence. Finally, when using levels of trust to explain 
compliance behavior, I also demonstrate how non-state influences can interact with other 
factors, causing their relationship to outcomes to be changed. In this case of this 
research, I found that trust improves compliance rates, but in countries where there is 
high trust and high fractionalization, we see an increase in the number of compliance 
violations. 
 The results of my empirical analyses also have theoretical implications. My 
research in this dissertation confirms the proposition that -  in contrast to the dominant 
state-centered view of international relations theory to explain the various aspects of 
international environmental politics - non-state actors have a significant impact on the 
process. Therefore these actors need to be theoretically incorporated in to our 
frameworks of explanation I also suggest a mechanism by which this influence may be 
operating. My argument is that while the state is still a key actor in the international 
arena, non state actors have a role to play. Specifically, I propose that non-state actors 
work to change the decision-making calculus of a state by applying pressure to 
policymakers and causing the state to pursue more pro-environmental policies. Therefore 
future research in this area should move away from the ‘death of the state/rise of non-
state actors’ debate alluded to in my introductory chapter, and instead focus on mapping 
the interactions between non-state actors and national governments, particularly with 
regard to how these interactions affect international outcomes.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
WORLD VALUES SURVEY: QUESTIONS USED 
 
 
PUBLIC SUPPORT 
 
B010- I am now going to read out some statements about the environment. For each one 
I read out, can you tell me whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree 
strongly? (Read out each statement and code an answer for each) 
 
[COUNTRY]'s environmental problems can be solved without any international 
agreements to handle them. 
Possible answers: 
o 1 Strongly agree  
o 2 Agree  
o 3 Disagree  
o 4 Strongly disagree  
 
PUBLIC ACTION 
 
B014- Which, if any, of these things have you done in the last 12 months, out of concern 
for the environment?. Have you decided for environmental reasons to reuse or recycle 
something rather than throw it away? 
 
Have you attended a meeting or signed a letter or petition aimed at protecting the 
environment? 
Possible answers: 
o 0 Have not  
o 1 Have done  
B015- Which, if any, of these things have you done in the last 12 months, out of concern 
for the environment? Have you decided for environmental reasons to reuse or recycle 
something rather than throw it away? 
 
Have you contributed to an environmental organization? 
Possible answers: 
 85
o 0 Have not  
o 1 Have done  
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APPENDIX B 
 
KYOTO CLASSIFICATIONS: ANNEX-1 / NON-ANNEX 120 
 
ANNEX 1 PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION  
 Australia 
 Austria 
 Belarus  
 Belgium 
 Bulgaria 
 Canada 
 Croatia  
 Czech Republic  
 Denmark 
 Estonia 
 European Union 
 Finland 
 France 
 Germany 
 Greece 
 Hungary 
 Iceland 
 Ireland 
 Italy  
 Japan 
 Latvia 
 Liechtenstein  
 Lithuania 
 Luxembourg 
 Monaco  
 Netherlands 
 New Zealand 
 Norway 
 Poland 
 Portugal 
 Romania 
 Russian Federation  
 Slovakia ** 
 Slovenia  
 Spain 
 Sweden 
 Switzerland 
                                                 
20 http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php 
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 Turkey  
 Ukraine  
 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
 United States of America 
 
NON ANNEX 1 PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION 
 Afghanistan 
 Albania  
 Algeria 
 Angola 
 Antigua and Barbuda 
 Argentina 
 Armenia  
 Azerbaijan 
 Bahamas 
 Bahrain 
 Bangladesh 
 Barbados 
 Belize 
 Benin 
 Bhutan 
 Bolivia 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 Botswana 
 Brazil 
 Brunei Darussalam 
 Burkina Faso 
 Burundi 
 Cambodia 
 Cameroon 
 Cape Verde 
 Central African Republic 
 Chad 
 Chile 
 China 
 Colombia 
 Comoros 
 Congo 
 Cook Islands 
 Costa Rica 
 Cuba 
 Cyprus 
 Côte d'Ivoire 
 Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
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 Democratic Republic of the Congo 
 Djibouti 
 Dominica 
 Dominican Republic 
 Ecuador 
 Egypt 
 El Salvador 
 Equatorial Guinea 
 Eritrea 
 Ethiopia 
 Fiji 
 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
 Gabon 
 Gambia 
 Georgia 
 Ghana 
 Grenada 
 Guatemala 
 Guinea 
 Guinea-Bissau 
 Guyana 
 Haiti 
 Honduras 
 India 
 Indonesia 
 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 
 Iraq 
 Israel 
 Jamaica 
 Jordan 
 Kazakhstan  
 Kenya 
 Kiribati 
 Kuwait 
 Kyrgyzstan 
 Lao People's Democratic Republic 
 Lebanon 
 Lesotho 
 Liberia 
 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
 Madagascar 
 Malawi 
 Malaysia 
 Maldives 
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 Mali 
 Malta 
 Marshall Islands 
 Mauritania 
 Mauritius 
 Mexico 
 Micronesia (Federated States of) 
 Mongolia 
 Montenegro 
 Morocco 
 Mozambique 
 Myanmar 
 Namibia 
 Nauru 
 Nepal 
 Nicaragua 
 Niger 
 Nigeria 
 Niue 
 Oman 
 Pakistan 
 Palau 
 Panama 
 Papua New Guinea 
 Paraguay 
 Peru 
 Philippines 
 Qatar 
 Republic of Korea 
 Republic of Moldova  
 Rwanda 
 Saint Kitts and Nevis 
 Saint Lucia 
 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
 Samoa 
 San Marino 
 Sao Tome and Principe 
 Saudi Arabia 
 Senegal 
 Serbia 
 Seychelles 
 Sierra Leone 
 Singapore 
 Solomon Islands 
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 Somalia 
 South Africa 
 Sri Lanka 
 Sudan 
 Suriname 
 Swaziland 
 Syrian Arab Republic 
 Tajikistan 
 Thailand 
 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
 Timor-Leste 
 Togo 
 Tonga 
 Trinidad and Tobago 
 Tunisia 
 Turkmenistan  
 Tuvalu 
 Uganda 
 United Arab Emirates 
 United Republic of Tanzania 
 Uruguay 
 Uzbekistan  
 Vanuatu 
 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 
 Viet Nam 
 Yemen 
 Zambia 
 Zimbabwe 
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